We compare two models of corporate default by calculating the JeffreysKullback-Leibler divergence between their predicted default probabilities when asset correlations are either high or low. Our main results show that the divergence between the two models increases in highly correlated, volatile, and large markets, but that it is closer to zero in small markets, when asset correlations are low and firms are highly leveraged. These findings suggest that during periods of financial instability the single-and multifactor models of corporate default will generate increasingly inconsistent predictions.
Introduction
The single-factor, single-firm structural model is the cornerstone of credit risk analysis, and has thus become the building block of international financial regulation in the Basel II and III Capital Adequacy Accords (BIS, 2006 (BIS, , 2011 . In this model pair-wise asset correlations can be ignored provided the respective assets account for an asymptotically small share of a credit portfolio (Gordy, 2003) . Although there is evidence that a multi-factor model would predict default risk more accurately because it would take into account asset correlations, the computational tractability of the single-factor model offsets its oversimplifying assumptions (Pykhtin, 2004; Emmer and Tasche, 2005; Tasche, 2006) . However, asset correlations have increased significantly in the past two decades, and even more so since the 2008 financial crisis (Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2015; Sandoval Jr. and De Paula Franca, 2012; Pollet and Wilson, 2010; Frank, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2009; Morana and Beltratti, 2008; Duffie et al., 2009; Das et al., 2007; Rangvid, 2001; Longin and Solnik, 1995, amongst others) . Higher co-movements of asset returns have negative repercussions for portfolio diversification, in which risk reduction hinges exclusively on imperfectly correlated assets. Diversification issues also arise in the risk management of portfolios of corporate debt, and of collateralised debt obligations, in which asset correlation and default correlation have been shown to be linked (Das et al., 2006; Lopez, 2004) . Credit risk analysis in industry and financial regulation relies almost exclusively on default probabilities calculated using Merton (1974) 's single factor structural model, which defines default as the event of the asset value of a corporate firm being lower than the face value if its debt. Merton (1974) 's model clearly ignores asset correlations, which are introduced in extensions developed by Vasicek (1991 Vasicek ( , 2002 ; Tasche (2006) ; Zhou (2001) ; Cathcart and El-Jahel (2004) . This paper builds a multi-factor model where individual corporate asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion which is correlated with that of other firms. We derive the multi-factor probability distribution of asset value and run Monte Carlo simulations assuming either high or low asset correlations 1 . We also run simulations of the single-factor probability of default, i.e., the default probability of a corporate whose asset value is not correlated with that of other firms. The correlation matrices used to simulate the multifactor default probability are randomly generated. Under the high correlation scenario, the pair-wise correlation coefficients are in the range [−0.99 For each pair of probabilities of default, we calculate its Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence. In the context of this paper, it quantifies the extent of the misrepresentation of the actual probability of default when the single factor rather than the multi-factor model is assumed to be the correct distribution generating asset values (or vice-versa) (Golan, 2006; Zellner, 2002; Kullback and Leibler, 1951; Burbea and Rao, 1982) . Entropy measures have been extensively used in finance. The maximum entropy principle (MEP) was used to estimate the probability distribution of the underlying asset of an option using the market option prices as data in Buchen and Kelly (1996) ; Neri and Schneider (2012) , and to estimate the price of stock and bond options in Gulko (1999 Gulko ( , 2002 . Securities derivatives in incomplete markets can also be priced by minimizing cross-entropy as shown in Branger (2004) . Borland (2002) ; Borland and Bouchaud (2004) build an optionpricing model derived from a non-Gaussian model of stock returns, which are assumed to evolve according to a nonlinear Fokker-Planck equation which maximizes the Tsallis nonextensive entropy. Finally, Maasoumi and Racine (2002) develop an entropy metric of dependence to show -amongst other results-that stock returns are serially dependent.
Our results show that the probability of default of an uncorrelated firm diverges significantly from that of a multi-correlated firm when asset correlations are high, but that it diverges much less when asset correlations are low. In some cases, the divergence is close to zero and the two models may be considered proxies for each other, namely, when asset correlations and market size are low, and the debt-to-asset-value ratio is high (150 to 200 percent). However, when market size, debt-to-value ratios and correlations are high, the two models produce inconsistent default probabilities. Clearly, as asset correlations rise the single-factor model starts to misrepresent actual default probabilities. Further cases are analysed in Section 4.
Overall, we find that the discrepancy between the two models is exacerbated when firm's 1 in our model correlations and volatility are either both high or both low. indebtedness is between 10 to 100 percent and in highly correlated markets. Our findings have implications for financial regulation. The Basel II and III Capital Adequacy Accords stipulate that capital provisions should be calculated in accordance with a single-factor, single-firm structural model (BIS, 2006 (BIS, , 2011 . Our paper suggests that in periods of financial instability, when asset volatility and correlations increase, one of the models may misreport default risk and thus lead to inadequate capital provisions. Our results are congruent with Aït-Sahalia and Xiu (2015); Pollet and Wilson (2010) ; Krishnan et al. (2009) . These papers find evidence that asset correlations have more predictive power than asset volatility. Further, Das et al. (2006) found that clustering of defaults occurs during times of high volatility because both default probabilities and correlation between defaults increase.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our main model and Section 3 measures of divergence. Simulations of high/low correlation matrices are described in Section 3.1. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of simulations of our model. Section 5 concludes and precedes the Appendix.
Multi-factor model of corporate value
Consider m dependent Brownian motions B t = (B 1,t , ..., B m,t ) defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P), where F(t) is the filtration associated with B t , and P a probability measure. The market has N firms with correlated asset values {V 1,t , ..., , V N,t }, for t ∈ [0, T ]. V i,t satisfies the differential equation
where µ i is its drift and σ i its volatility. The Brownian motions B j,t are correlated, in the sense that dB jt dB kt = ρ jk , for j, k = 1, ..., m, with correlation coefficient
B j,t , j = 1, ..., m can be rewritten as a function of independent Brownian motions W j,t . Let
and
then, by substituting in (2) and (3) in (1), (1) becomes
We show below that the volatility of V i,t , i = 1, .., N , depends on the pair-wise covariances between the m stochastic processes W j,t driving the value of the other firms in the market.
Proposition 2.1. The solution of (4) is the set of values {V 1,t , ..., , V N,t } such that
where exp{.} ≡ e (.) is the exponential function. Moreover, V i,t is log-Normally distributed with mean
and variance
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Default is defined as the event of the value of the i-th firm, V i,T , being lower than the face value of its debt D i at a given time t = T . The probability of this event is
where
where N m (.) is the cumulative Normal distribution of X i,t when m > 1.
The single-factor model is retrieved from (4) and (5) for m = 1,
where N s (.) is the cumulative Normal distribution of X i,t when m = 1.
The model presented above is closely related to the single-and multi-factor models used extensively in credit risk analysis (Tasche, 2006; Pykhtin, 2004; Vasicek, 2002) . In these papers, pairwise correlations between two assets are not directly modelled. It is assumed instead that both assets are correlated to one (or more) underlying factor(s), and that the assets are independent from each other conditional on the common factor(s). Their set-up can be retrieved from our model by assuming that each Brownian motion
where Y is the (single) common factor, and i is a firmspecific error, rather than dB jt dB kt = ρ jk , for j, k = 1, ..., m as we do above.
Divergence measures and simulation of correlation matrices
We examine the discrepancy between (11) and (9) by measuring the Jeffreys-KullbackLeibler divergence between these two probabilities. Let f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) be two probability distribution functions over R m , where m is the number of dependent Brownian motions in Section 2 above.
The Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence measure between f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) is defined as
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence or cross-entropy 2 . (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) . Although (13) does satisfy I 1,2 (f 1 , f 1 ) = 0 and the positivity condition I 1,2 (f 1 , f 2 ) > 0 whenever f 1 = f 2 , it is not a true metric distance, because it is not symmetric and does not satisfy the triangle inequality (Ullah, 1996) . However, it can be thought of as an "entropy distance" between f 1 (x) and f 2 (x). It quantifies the loss of information occuring when considering f 2 (x) as the correct probability distribution when the true distribution is f 1 (x). If we were to use the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure, we would have to arbitrarily decide whether the multi-factor or the single-factor probability of default is the true probability of default. Owing to the asymmetry of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, if the multi-factor distribution f m is assumed to be the true distribution, then
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to measuring the divergence between the probability of default resulting from two different models of corporate default without making a priori assumptions about the accuracy of any one model. Consequently, we opt for a symmetric extension of the Kullback-Leibler measure proposed in Kullback and Leibler (1951) and Burbea and Rao (1982) , the Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence measure.
Substituting (13) into (12), (12) becomes
(14) remains a pseudo-metric, since it violates the triangle inequality, but it does satisfy all the other properties of a metric (Kullback and Leibler, 1951; Ullah, 1996) .
2 (13) reduces to the Shannon entropy when f 2 (x) is a uniform distribution, i.e. − ∞ 0 f 1 (x)log(f 1 (x))dx.
Simulating correlation matrices
The most straightforward way to simulate a random correlation matrix consists of generating random data from a given distribution and then calculate their pair-wise correlations. However, the resulting matrix may not necessarily have the desired consistently high (or low) pairwise correlations. The simulated correlation structure should also be realistic. A deterministic matrix in which all off-diagonal entries are equal to 0.9 would fulfill the requirement of having a high correlation structure. It would nonetheless be a very poor proxy for the asset correlations found in most financial markets. In order to systematically generate realistic positive definite matrices with given correlations, we adapt an algorithm created by Hardin et al. (2013) . In their paper, a "noise" is added to a correlation matrix in such a way that the resulting matrix will have blocks of pair-wise correlations whose values are within a predetermined range.
More precisely, let S = (S ij ) m i,j=1 be a m × m matrix generated by calculating the pairwise correlations of random data. From a Uniform probability distribution we draw a "noise" δ ij ∈ [−1, 1] which is added to S ij , i = j, subject to the restriction that the resulting entryŜ ij = S ij + δ ij , i = j, should be between [ρ min , ρ max ]. In our "high asset correla- Our main modification to Hardin et al. (2013) 's algorithm is that we allow δ ij , ρ min and ρ max to be negative, since financial asset correlations can be either positive or negative. In their paper correlations are always positive.
Results and discussion
We ran 2000 Monte Carlo simulations of the multi-factor and single factor probabilities of default 3 , for a given number of firms N =10,50,90,100,500, and 1000 4 , and a given level of debt leverage ln(D i /V i )=0.1,.., 2, in steps of 0.1. For each simulation, we randomly estimate a high correlation N × N matrix. This procedure is repeated for low correlation matrices. The results of each set of simulations are 2000 values for the Jeffreys-KullbackLeibler divergence (14), from which we calculate the averages shown in Figure 1 and Table  4 . Our main results are summarised as follows.
The divergence between the multi-factor and the single-factor probability of default increases with asset correlation.
For N =10 to 100 firms, the graph of the low correlation divergence is significantly below that of the high correlation divergence. For N = 10 firms, leverage equal to 10%, and low correlation, the average divergence isJ L =0.3400. For the same number of firms and 3 All our simulations were run in R (R Core Team, 2016) . The algorithm that generates random correlation matrices was adapted from Hardin et al. (2013) and Joe (2006) . 4 For the sake of simplicity, we set N = m in the simulations.
leverage, but high correlation,J H =0.5669. The divergences for a leverage of 200% -all else equal-areJ L = 0.0575 andJ H =0.1377. Table 1 shows analogous results for other levels of leverage and market sizes. This suggests that in periods of high correlation, e.g., financial crises, the multi-factor default probability will differ significantly from that of the single-factor model. One of the two models may underestimate the true default probability. For larger market sizes, N =500 and 1000, the discrepancy between the high and low correlation divergences is reduced. This issue is addressed in detail below.
The divergence between the multi-factor and the single-factor probability of default is inversely related to leverage.
This result indicates that the more indebted the firm, the less discrepancy between the information given by the two models. For N =50 and low correlation,
, all else equal. Clearly, in the case of highly indebted firms, default probability tends to be similar under either model,. Figure 1 suggests that irrespective of asset correlations, the divergence between the two probabilities tends to zero when debt leverage increases. The implication is that for lower levels of leverage, the two probabilities of default will diverge considerably, and will be influenced by asset correlations. For instance, it can be seen in Table 4 that for a leverage equal to 50%, high correlation and N =50, the average divergence isJ H =0.3498, against J L =0.2636. At that level of leverage, the multi-factor and single factor probabilities of default will give contradictory signals.
Irrespective of asset correlations, the difference betweenJ
H andJ L diminishes with the number of firms.
For larger market sizes, N =500 and 1000 firms, the difference between the high/low correlation divergences diminishes, and even seems to disappear in Figure 1 . Table 1 shows that for ln(D i /V i )=150%, and N =1000 firms,J L = 0.1772 whilstJ H = 0.1833. However, this difference is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level, as evidenced by the Welch test of equality of means shown in Table 2 . The Welch test is also significant at 1% confidence level for all other market sizes and leverage values. It should be emphasized that we are not suggesting that the multi-factor and single-factor default probabilities will converge or even equalize when the number of firms increases. As long asJ = 0, the two probabilities of default will diverge. Tables 1 and 2 support this finding even in large markets.
The divergence between the two models increases with market size.
This can be seen in Figure 1 N = 1000, and leverage at 200%, high and low correlation divergences become closer to each other in value,J L =0.1425 andJ L =0.1547, but they are still markedly higher than the respective divergences for N = 10.
Conclusion
This paper builds a multi-factor model where individual corporate asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion which is correlated with that of other firms. We run simulations of the multi-factor default probability using randomly generated low and high correlation matrices. We also run simulations of the single factor default probability, i.e., the default probability of a corporate with uncorrelated asset value. For each pair of default probabilities we calculate its Jeffreys-Kullback-Leibler divergence. Overall, we find that the discrepancy between the two models is exacerbated in highly correlated markets and when firm's indebtedness is between 10 to 100 percent. Our findings have implications for financial regulation. The Basel II and III Capital Adequacy Accords stipulate that capital provisions should be calculated in accordance with a single-factor, single-firm structural model (BIS, 2006 (BIS, , 2011 . Our paper suggests that in periods of financial instability, when asset volatility and correlations increase, one of the models may misreport default risk and thus lead to inadequate capital provisions.
A.1 Self-similarity of Brownian motions
A stochastic process {W t , t ≥ 0} is said to have independent increments, if for any m ≥ 1 and for any partition 0 ≤ t 0 < t 1 < .. < t m , W t 1 − W t 0 , .., W tm − W t m−1 are independent. A formal definition of a Brownian motion will be useful in the proof of Theorem A.2.
Definition A.1. If a stochastic process {W t , t ≥ 0} satisfies (i) W 0 = 0 a.s.,
(ii) it has independent and stationary increments, (iii) for each t > 0, W t has a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance t, and (iv) its sample paths are continuous a.s., then it is called (standard) Brownian motion. Definition A.2. A stochastic process {W t , t ≥ 0} is said to be self-similar if for any a > 0, there exists b > 0 such that
where " d =" means equality in distribution.
The following theorem was proved by Lamperti (1962) and shows that a self-similar stochastic process W at is equal in distribution to the stochastic process a H W t . In many texts on the topic, a self-similar process is defined by this property.
Theorem A.1. (Lamperti (1962) ) If {W t , t ≥ 0} is nontrivial, stochastically continuous at t=0 and self-similar, then there exists a unique exponent H ≥ 0 such that b in (15) can be expressed as b = aH. Moreover, H > 0 if and only if W 0 = 0 a.s.
The following theorem will be used in our proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for every a > 0, W at is also Brownian motion as defined in A.1 above.
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) are trivially fulfilled. Regarding (iii), Gaussianity and meanzero property also follow from the properties of W t . To obtain the variance, consider the stochastic process a −1/2 W at , t ≥ 0. Its variance is
Thus W at is a Brownian motion.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof that (5) is the solution of (4) can be found in Etheridge (2001) or Shreve (2004) , amongst others. The distributional properties of V i,t are not proved in the literature, due to it being the building block of option-pricing models, rather than a stand-alone model as in this paper.
Proof. Let X t = exp{(µ i − 
since the terms in the first exponential are non-random. Given that the m Brownian motions W 1,t , ..., W m,t are independent, the term in the expectation function can be written as
From the 1/2-self-similarity property, E exp σ i,j t 1/2 W t,j
Since W j,t is N(0,1), E[e aW j,t ] = e a 2 /2 , where a is a real constant. This implies that 
The variance of X t , V ar(X t ) = E[X V i,t = V i,0 X t . Since V i,0 is a constant, the mean and variance of V i,t follow trivially.
